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Fixed-term employment and job satisfaction: 
Evidence from individual-level data accounting for selectivity bias 
 
Abstract: 
The present paper examines the relationship between fixed-term employment and job 
satisfaction using individual-level data from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
According to theoretical expectations, fixed-term employment should be associated with a 
relative low level of job satisfaction, and the majority of empirical investigations is actually in 
line with this prediction. However, none of these studies accounts for the fact that a worker’s 
choice of whether or not to accept a temporary working contract might substantially be driven 
by individual characteristics and would then be endogenous. In contrast to prior studies, our 
preferred model specification explicitly accounts for a potential selectivity bias. The 
estimation results of our treatment effects model indicate a positive connection between fixed-
term employment and job satisfaction. Hence, we conclude that job satisfaction on average is 
not negatively affected by the pure duration of an employment contract, but by individual 
characteristics, job-related factors, and working conditions. Nevertheless, we would not 
recommend firms to replace permanent by fixed-term workers as the latter are more satisfied 
with their jobs associated with higher motivation and productivity levels. Instead, firms are 
encouraged to improve working conditions, especially for better educated and more tenured 
workers. 
 
Keywords: Fixed-term employment; job satisfaction; selectivity bias.  
JEL classification: C21, C25, J28, M12 
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1 Introduction 
 
The number of debates about the desirability and the drawbacks of flexible forms of 
employment has tremendously increased in recent years. Apart from part-time work, jobs 
offered by temporary help agencies, and non-social security system employment, fixed-term 
employment contracts represent an important instrument of flexible employment 
opportunities. From the viewpoint of firms, fixed-term contracts are beneficial, since they 
enable firms to adjust their workforce to demand fluctuations at a comparatively low expense. 
Particularly in countries with high levels of employment protection and high dismissal costs, 
e.g. Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, firms have increasingly been using temporary 
working contracts as an instrument of flexible adjustment. Nowadays, about 12 percent of the 
employees in the European Union are employed on the basis of temporary contracts. Young 
and first-time employees are particularly affected by temporary work arrangements, which 
indicates a second advantage associated with the use of fixed-term employment contracts. 
Usually, employers lack adequate information about the traits and abilities of the workers 
currently selected. Thus, they have an incentive to initially employ their workers on the basis 
of temporary contracts in order to screen them for permanent positions. As a consequence, 
fixed term contracts do not only possess the advantage of serving as an instrument of flexible 
adjustment but also as a screening device. 
 
It is important to note that the use of fixed-term work arrangements contributes to generate a 
segmented intra-firm employment structure with core employees being permanently 
employed and fixed-term employees representing the flexibility reserve. Workers belonging 
to the flexibility reserve usually have less job security, lower earnings and fewer other job 
rewards compared to permanent core workers. Consequently, fixed-term workers are expected 
to report lower job satisfaction compared to individuals employed on the basis of permanent 
working contracts. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether fixed-term contracts are indeed associated 
with a deterioration of employees’ job satisfaction. For this purpose, we use individual-level 
data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). Although the discussion so far clearly 
supports the perspective that fixed-term employees should be less satisfied with their job than 
permanent workers, there are other arguments coming to a reverse conclusion. For example, 
fixed-term workers may even be more satisfied with their job than permanent workers, since 
 2
the temporary job enabled them to leave the unemployment status, and hence, having got a 
job at all is of greater value for them than for permanent workers. Another argument for the 
hypothesis that fixed-term workers may report higher job satisfaction levels is that they are 
strongly motivated to achieve a permanent job in the future. 
 
Therefore, the theoretical discussion is not unambiguous. In contrast to the theoretical debate, 
the majority of empirical studies provides evidence for a negative impact of fixed-term 
employment on job satisfaction. Some other studies do not find a significant correlation 
between fixed-term employment contracts and job satisfaction at all. A major drawback of 
these investigations, however, is that none of them explicitly accounts for a potential 
selectivity bias. Since job satisfaction is usually measured at an ordinal scale, almost all 
studies apply the standard ordered probit model to estimate the effect of temporary 
employment on job satisfaction and thereby neglect a possible selectivity bias. However, the 
reported level of job satisfaction is unlikely to be independent from an individual’s choice of 
whether or not to accept a fixed-term employment contract. Hence, not accounting for the 
individual’s endogenous contract decision can be associated with inconsistent parameter 
estimates that are either biased upward or downward. In order to test for a potential selectivity 
bias, we estimate a treatment effects model in addition to the usual ordered probit model and 
binary choice models and compare the magnitude and the signs of the relevant coefficients. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present an overview of the theoretical 
discussion concerning the impact of fixed-term employment on job satisfaction. Section 3 
provides a brief review of the previous empirical literature. In section 4, we present our 
econometric analysis on the relation between fixed-term contracts and job satisfaction using 
the GSOEP-data. Section 5 contains our management implications derived from the 
regression results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical considerations 
 
It is primarily the sociological and psychological literature which deals with the determinants 
and consequences of differences in individuals’ reported job satisfaction. Since job 
satisfaction plays a crucial role with regard to overall subjective well-being of employees and 
subjective well-being can be considered as “the central economic variable driving individuals’ 
decisions” (Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2000: 518), it is not surprising that the economic and 
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management literature has increasingly drawn its attention on the causes and consequences of 
job satisfaction throughout the years. However, so far relatively little research has been done 
with respect to the relationship between temporary working contracts and employees’ job 
satisfaction. 
 
In principle, temporary employment contracts can either have a positive or negative effect on 
employees’ job satisfaction. A negative relationship is more obvious and can be explained as 
follows: The first argument relates to job insecurity which is often associated with temporary 
working contracts. Job insecurity reflects the concern of employees to lose their current job. A 
secure job not only provides individuals with the essential monetary income, it also enables 
them to establish social contacts and influences individuals’ scheduling and time 
management. As a consequence, the loss of a job implies a threat for important financial, 
social and societal resources (De Witte, 1999). Therefore, job insecurity is likely to 
deteriorate individuals’ job satisfaction and well-being (Sverke et al., 2002). Since temporary 
contracts by definition have a limited duration and employment continuity is not guaranteed, 
job satisfaction for concerned employees can expected to be relatively low. 
 
Another explanation for the hypothesis that holding a temporary contract is likely to reduce an 
individual’s level of job satisfaction can be derived from the psychological contract theory 
(Guest, 2000; Shore and Tetrick, 1994). According to this theory, contracts are typically 
characterized by an employee’s perception of reciprocal obligations between employer and 
employee. The substance of these obligations refers to the worker’s contributions to the 
organization, e.g., effort, competencies, and loyalty, in relation to the returns of the employer, 
e.g., payment, job security, and promotion opportunities (Isaksson et al., 2003). The 
psychological contract theory implies that productive working requires a balanced relation 
between the workers contributions and rewards. When employees perceive an unbalanced 
relation, the psychological contract is violated. As a consequence, job satisfaction will decline 
encouraging the employee to restore the disturbed balance. According to the psychological 
contract theory, temporary employees perceive an inequality between contributions and 
rewards, when they are very unlikely to get permanently employed, in spite of high effort, and 
when the employer mostly decides unilaterally regarding the usage of fixed-term workers and 
their assignments (De Witte and Näswall, 2003). 
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A further theoretical explanation for the expected negative relationship between temporary 
contracts and job satisfaction relates to the effects of social comparison processes. These 
processes implicate that an individual conducts a comparative evaluation of the own 
employment situation with that of a reference person. In the context of temporary work 
arrangements the evaluation of social comparison processes suggests that fixed-term workers 
may perceive themselves as disadvantaged compared to permanently employed workers. If 
fixed-term workers choose permanent workers as the reference group, they may subjectively 
feel deprivation and inequality at their expense (Pearce, 1998). For example, fixed-term 
workers may feel relative deprivation, if they compare their level of job security to that of 
permanent workers. In accordance with the theory of social comparison processes, the 
perception of being disadvantaged relative to others is related to a declining level of job 
satisfaction (Beard and Edwards, 1995; Kochan et al., 1994). 
 
A complementary explanation for the anticipated negative effect of fixed-term employment 
contracts on an employee’s job satisfaction can be derived from the theory of segmented 
labour markets, which has been introduced by Doeringer and Piore (1971). The simultaneous 
use of permanent and fixed-term work arrangements divides the intra-firm employment 
structure into two segments. One segment contains the permanently employed core workers. 
The other segment contains the fixed-term employees representing the flexibility reserve. The 
employment of workers with short-term contracts enables firms to adjust their workforce to 
demand fluctuations at a comparatively low expense and is therefore an instrument of flexible 
adjustment. Permanent core workers are thus much more likely to have secure jobs, higher 
earnings and better promotion opportunities than fixed-term workers. As a result, inequality-
averse fixed-term workers are suggested to report a lower level of job satisfaction than 
individuals employed on the basis of permanent working contracts. 
 
The discussion so far is consistent with the hypothesis that fixed-term employees are expected 
to be less satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers. However, there are also other 
arguments contradicting this view. For example, fixed-term workers can even be assumed to 
be more satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers, if the temporary job enabled them 
to leave the unemployment status. Hence, having got a job at all is more important to them 
than for workers who are employed on the basis of a permanent contract. Permanent workers 
face a relatively high job security and may therefore assess the pure employment status less 
valuable than temporarily employed workers, whose jobs are much more insecure. Hence, a 
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relatively high job satisfaction of fixed-term employees may stem from a higher assessment of 
the value of employment. Another argument is that fixed-term workers may have higher job 
satisfaction levels, because they are strongly motivated to achieve a permanent job in the 
future. This point is related to the tournament theory of Lazear and Rosen (1981). In this 
context, temporarily employed workers compete against each other to achieve a permanent 
job. The winner’s prize is therefore a promotion from temporary to permanent employment. 
When firms use fixed-term contracts as a screening device and actually offer their temporarily 
employed workers the opportunity to be promoted on a permanent job, high effort levels, 
which are necessary to obtain the permanent job, and high job satisfaction levels may 
coincide. 
 
3 Previous empirical research  
 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the economists’ interest in individuals’ job 
satisfaction levels is quite new, while psychology and sociology have a much longer tradition 
in investigating the determinants and consequences of job satisfaction. The rarity of economic 
research on job satisfaction could at least partially be attributed to the fact that in contrast to 
wages and other labour market outcomes representing continuously measurable and thus 
objective indicators, job satisfaction is strongly subject to individual assessments, which 
implies that interpersonal comparisons are quite difficult to conduct (Freeman, 1978; Kaiser, 
2002). Despite this restriction, an economic analysis of the determination of job satisfaction is 
of major importance, because job satisfaction is likely to have a positive influence on the 
motivation and productivity of employees. Some empirical studies have already confirmed 
this presumed effect (Mangione and Quinn, 1975; Clegg, 1983). 
 
The previous empirical research provides a couple of studies, which either examine the 
relationship between temporary employment contracts and job insecurity (Isaksson et al., 
2003) or the connection between job insecurity and job satisfaction (Schlese and Schramm, 
1994; Ashford et al., 1989; Sverke et al., 2002). There are, however, only a few empirical 
studies on the impact of different durations of employment contracts on the employees’ job 
satisfaction. Petrongolo (2004) conducts one of those studies. Using data from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey of the years 1994 to 1999, she differentiates between 
overall job satisfaction and different dimensions of job satisfaction, e.g., satisfaction with 
earnings, job security, type of job, and working hours. She estimates an ordered probit model, 
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controlling for the usual individual and job characteristics. The results imply that temporary 
employment contracts reduce overall job satisfaction as well as satisfaction with earnings, job 
security, and the type of job. 
 
Kaiser (2002) also uses data from the European Community Household Panel and conducts 
his examination on the relationship between fixed-term contracts and the individuals’ job 
satisfaction for a specific collection of countries: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and the United Kingdom. In contrast to Petrongolo (2004), he estimates an ordinary 
probit model distinguishing between overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with job security and 
satisfaction with working hours.1 The estimation results imply that being employed on the 
basis of a temporary contract is associated with a deterioration of overall job satisfaction in all 
countries, except Denmark. Similarly, the examination of the relation between fixed-term 
contracts and satisfaction with job security does also show the expected negative effect. 
 
Another study stems from D’Addio et al. (2003). Using data for Denmark from the European 
Community Household Panel the authors examine the impact of fixed-term employment 
contracts on overall job satisfaction and estimate fixed effects ordered logit and random 
effects ordered probit models. The estimation of models on the basis of panel data enables the 
authors to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity, which – similarly to selectivity – 
is another source of inconsistently estimated coefficients. The results show that being 
employed on a fixed-term contract has a significant negative effect on job satisfaction for 
male employees, while the effect for female employees is insignificant. 
 
Booth et al. (2002) make use of data from the British Household Panel between 1991 and 
1997. The authors estimate an ordered probit model and distinguish between overall job 
satisfaction and seven different components of job satisfaction. According to their results, 
there is no difference in overall job satisfaction between workers being employed on the basis 
of temporary contracts and workers in permanent jobs. Regarding the different components of 
job satisfaction, the results show, however, that temporary workers are less satisfied with job 
security and promotion prospects. Also using the British Household Panel and estimating an 
ordered probit model, Clark (1996) does not find significant differences in job satisfaction 
between temporarily and permanently employed individuals. 
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Kalleberg and Reynolds (2003) present an interesting study about the relation between non-
standard work arrangements and employees’ job satisfaction. The authors use a cross-national 
survey data set, the 1997 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) module on “work 
orientations”. With the aid of this data set, the authors are able to examine the relationship 
between temporary work and job satisfaction in the United States, Japan, and a number of 
European countries. The results of their investigation show that temporary workers do not 
generally differ from permanent workers in terms of job satisfaction. However, this outcome 
does not hold for West Germany and Norway. In both countries the authors obtain a positive 
effect of temporary employment on employees’ job satisfaction. 
 
In their investigation of the relationship between fixed-term working contracts and 
employees’ job satisfaction Ellingson et al. (1998) distinguish between workers, who are 
voluntarily or involuntarily employed on the basis of a fixed-term contract. The authors 
assume that some individuals prefer temporary contracts to permanent jobs, because of the 
flexibility and variation that goes along with fixed-term work arrangements. These individuals 
are identified as voluntary fixed-term employees. In contrast, there are also individuals who 
accept temporary jobs because they have no alternative job options. If these individuals were 
able to choose between permanent and temporary jobs, they would prefer a permanent job. 
These individuals are identified as involuntary fixed-term employees. The estimation results 
indicate that job satisfaction is negatively affected, when workers are involuntarily employed 
on the basis of a fixed-term contract, while the reverse is true for workers being voluntarily 
employed on the basis of a fixed-term contract. 
 
Finally, using data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) between 1999 and 2001 
Henneberger et al. (2004) investigate the impact of fixed-term employment on three 
dimensions of job satisfaction – overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with the wage, and 
satisfaction with the intra-firm atmosphere. First, the ordered probit estimates show that 
female workers who are employed on the basis of a fixed-term contract are more satisfied 
with their wages than permanently employed women, while there are no significant 
differences between male fixed-term and permanent workers. Second, the authors find an 
inverse relationship between fixed-term employment and the satisfaction with the intra-firm 
atmosphere. However, this result does only hold for male workers. Third and most 
importantly, fixed-term employment is found to be positively related to overall job 
satisfaction. According to the model estimates, fixed-term employees are less likely to be 
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generally dissatisfied with their jobs, while they are more likely to be very satisfied with their 
jobs than permanent workers. 
 
To summarize, the vast majority of empirical studies either conclude that fixed-term workers 
are less satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers or they have found no significant 
differences between fixed-term and permanent workers. There are only a few exceptions so 
far finding indications for a positive effect of fixed-term working contracts on job satisfaction. 
At a first glance, a positive relationship may appear to be somewhat surprising. However, the 
discussion in section 2 has demonstrated that there may also be good reasons for temporarily 
employed workers to be more satisfied with their jobs than their permanently employed 
counterparts. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that none of these studies explicitly account for a potential 
selectivity bias. However, selectivity represents an important econometric estimation problem 
to be accounted for in order to avoid inconsistent and biased parameter estimates. In the 
present context, an individual’s choice of whether or not to accept a fixed-term job offer is 
very likely to be correlated with the level of job satisfaction. Therefore, the individual 
characteristics determining this decision have to be an integral part of the model specification 
to account for a possible selectivity bias sufficiently. As a consequence, our estimation 
strategy in the following section 4 is to specify a treatment effects model and compare the 
parameter estimates for fixed-term employment with the corresponding coefficients resulting 
from the more conventional ordered probit and binary choice model, respectively. 
 
4 Econometric analysis: fixed-term contracts and job satisfaction 
 
4.1 Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). 
The GSOEP is a longitudinal study of private households in Germany. It started in 1984 and 
from that time on the same households have been surveyed annually. The panel offers 
information on German citizens and immigrants living in the eastern or western part of 
Germany. The GSOEP questionnaires contain two thematic areas. First, GSOEP data cover a 
wide range of subjects, for example, personality traits, occupational and family biographies, 
employment and professional mobility, earnings, health, individual satisfaction, household 
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composition and living situation. Second, the GSOEP also covers subjects in recent elements 
in the survey. These elements contain topics such as education, training, family and social 
services, social security and environmental behaviour. 
 
The GSOEP offers a very extensive database, which is characterized by a high level of 
constancy over time. For example, in 1984, the first year of the survey, 5,921 households with 
12,290 individuals participated in West Germany. In 2004, 3,724 of these households with 
6,811 individuals were still responding the questionnaire. 
 
In order to examine the relationship between fixed-term contracts and employees’ job 
satisfaction, we use the GSOEP wave of the year 2000. In our analysis individuals’ job 
satisfaction is considered as the dependent variable. In the GSOEP questionnaire job 
satisfaction is covered as: “How satisfied are you with your work today?” The responses to 
job satisfaction are measured at an ordinal scale ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 
(completely satisfied). Table 1 displays the distribution of the job satisfaction values 
achieved. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The distribution of the variable job satisfaction shows that the respondents exhibit a 
remarkably high level of job satisfaction. The mean value is 7.14, the median is 8. 
 
In our study, the explanatory variable of main interest measures, whether an individual is 
currently employed on the basis of a fixed-term or a permanent contract. Thereby, we focus 
only on full-time workers and exclude part-time workers from our analysis. Since we aim at 
examining whether or not temporary employment is associated with higher or lower levels of 
job satisfaction than permanent employment, we are forced to exclude certain employee 
groups from our sample in order to avoid an estimation bias. Additionally, we do not consider 
other forms of employment, which are also not relevant for our analysis, i.e., self-
employment, employment of apprentices, and employment of public servants. 
 
Table 2 presents the mean values of the dependent variable and some explanatory variables 
used in this study separated for contingent and permanent workers. Some of these variables 
describe socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals, i.e., age, sex, education, marital 
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status, nationality. Others, including the dependent variable job satisfaction, describe job 
characteristics, i.e., the log gross monthly wage, occupational status, firm size, the use of 
computers at the workplace, training opportunities, the amount of tenure, and the fact of 
working in the origin job, working hours, work at night or at weekend, and working in the 
public sector. This comparative analysis gives first insights on specific differences between 
contingent and permanent workers and allows to gain information on the determination of 
fixed-term employment. A more detailed description of the considered variables can be found 
in the appendix in Table A1. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
According to the calculated means there are only slight differences between fixed-term and 
permanent workers regarding the average level of job satisfaction. Furthermore, fixed-term 
workers do not seem to differ substantially from permanent workers in the years of education, 
nationality, working hours, and the need to work at night or at weekend. However, there are 
significant differences with respect to other characteristics. For example, contingent workers 
seem to earn much less than permanent workers. They are much younger and have much less 
tenure than permanent workers. Moreover, permanent workers are more likely to use a 
personal computer at work, participate in continuous training programmes, and work in their 
certified job. Finally, fixed-term workers are more often female, unmarried and working in 
the public sector. 
 
4.2 Econometric modelling 
 
In the GSOEP questionnaires the individuals are asked to provide information about the level 
of satisfaction with their current job using an ordinal scale that ranges from 0 (completely 
dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Since job satisfaction is the dependent variable in 
our investigation, we apply an ordered probit model to estimate the determination of the 
individuals’ job satisfaction. Our main interest is to evaluate, whether or not workers who are 
currently employed on the basis of a fixed-term contract have a different level of job 
satisfaction relative to permanent workers. In order to additionally account for individual 
characteristics, occupational status, job-related factors, working conditions, and other 
potential determinants we regress our ordinally scaled dependent variable job satisfaction on a 
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dummy variable measuring whether a worker is temporarily or permanently employed and the 
other covariates introduced in the previous subsection. 
 
Referring to the analysis of the previous subsection, the econometric model of job satisfaction 
(JS) has the general form 
,* vFTEXJS ++= γβ          (1) 
where  is a latent variable indicating the unobservable level of job satisfaction of the 
employees. FTE is a dummy variable that separates fixed-term employees from permanent 
workers, X is a matrix containing individual socio-demographic characteristics, job-related 
factors, information on working conditions and the occupational status, and other control 
variables. Finally, β and γ represent the coefficients to be estimated and v  is a stochastic error 
term with the usual assumptions, i.e., normal distribution, zero mean, and finite variance. 
Since individual job satisfaction cannot precisely be observed, equation (1) cannot directly be 
estimated. Instead, the ordinally scaled variable JOBSAT is estimated as a linear function of 
the explanatory variables and a set of cut points 
*JS
iθ . In the ordered probit model, the 
probability of a given observation is 
( ) ( )
( )( ) (( ,
Pr Pr
1
1
FTEXFTEX
FTEXiJOBSAT
ii
ii
γβθγβθ ))
θνγβθ
+−Φ−+−Φ=
≤++<==
−
−    (2) 
where , and  is the standard cumulative distribution function. 10,,0K=i ( )⋅Φ
 
The descriptive analysis in subsection 4.1 indicates that the average level of job satisfaction of 
temporarily employed workers is quite similar to the level of permanent workers. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that a multiple regression analysis cannot identify significant 
differences so that job satisfaction patterns may actually deviate substantially. In order to 
provide an alternative estimation approach to the ordered probit model we estimate binary 
choice models using the probit maximum likelihood (ML) approach. Our idea behind this 
estimation strategy is that even if average job satisfaction of temporary and permanent 
workers is quite similar, temporary workers might report more frequently higher or lower job 
satisfaction levels than permanent workers. The binary choice models then examine whether 
or not temporary workers are more likely to self-select themselves into lower or higher job 
satisfaction levels than permanent workers. 
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The dichotomous dependent variable of our binary choice model representing an employee’s 
selection into lower levels of job satisfaction is defined as 
 
.otherwise,0
 4if,1
_ ⎩⎨
⎧ ≤= JOBSATLOWJS        (3) 
Correspondingly, the dichotomous dependent variable representing an employee’s selection 
into higher levels of job satisfaction is defined as 
 
.otherwise,0
 9if,1
_ ⎩⎨
⎧ ≥= JOBSATHIGHJS        (4) 
If the latent variable  in (1) is replaced by JS_LOW or JS_HIGH specified in (3) and (4), 
respectively, the probit ML estimation approach can be applied. The descriptive statistics of 
JS_LOW and JS_HIGH are summarized in Table 3. 
*JS
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The results show that only 9 percent of the respondents indicated to be relatively dissatisfied 
with their work (job satisfaction levels 0 to 4). On the contrary, about 23 percent of the 
respondents reported to be highly satisfied with their work (job satisfaction levels 9 and 10).2 
 
So far, the model specification does not explicitly account for a potential selectivity bias that 
may occur if an employee’s decision process to accept or reject a fixed-term contract is not 
exogenous in the model. Not accounting for the employee’s selection decision may lead to 
inconsistent parameter estimates, so that the effect of fixed-term employment on job 
satisfaction is either overestimated or underestimated. More precisely, the effect which has 
falsely been attributed to a temporary employment contract can truly be driven by individual 
characteristics encouraging an individual to accept or reject a temporary job offer and not by 
the duration of the working contact. An estimation model that explicitly accounts for a 
potential selectivity bias is the treatment effects model. 
 
The treatment effects model estimates the effect of our endogenous binary treatment FTE on a 
continuous, fully observed variable job satisfaction (JS). The primary regression equation is 
.vFTEXJS ++= γβ          (5) 
In contrast to equation (1), the dummy variable FTE in equation (5) is considered as 
endogenous indicating whether or not the treatment is assigned. The binary decision to obtain 
the treatment FTE is modelled as the outcome of an unobserved latent variable *FTE . This 
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variable is assumed to be a linear function of a set of exogenous covariates Z and an error 
term ε, i.e., 
.* εδ += ZFTE           (6) 
The parameter vector δ represents the coefficients of the covariates in Z. It is important to 
note that the decision of an individual to accept or reject a fixed-term employment contract is 
observable: 
 
.otherwise,0
 0if,1 *
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ >= FTEFTE          (7) 
The error terms ε and ν are bivariate normally distributed with mean zero and covariance 
matrix 
( ) .
1
, ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ρ
ρσνεCov           (8) 
In the present case, the individual’s decision to accept or reject a fixed-term job offer is 
assumed to depend on a set of individual characteristics, i.e., sex, marital status, age, 
nationality, and years of education. 
 
The estimation of the treatment effects model requires a slight modification of the dependent 
variable JOBSAT, which is originally measured at an ordinal scale. However, the dependent 
variable of the treatment effects model JS in equation (5) has to be continuous. A 
continuously scaled variable JS can be generated by standardizing the ordinal variable 
JOBSAT using an approach introduced by Bresnahan, Brynjofsson and Hitt (2002), i.e., 
,
JS
JSJOBSATJS σ
μ−=          (9) 
where JSμ  is the mean and JSσ  is the standard deviation of JOBSAT. After this 
transformation the coefficient of interest γ is estimated consistently using the full maximum 
likelihood estimator (MLE).3 
 
4.3 Empirical results 
 
The results of our ordered probit model are summarized in Table 4. Apart from our major 
variable of interest fixed-term employment (FTE) the estimation model contains several 
individual socio-demographic explanatory variables (sex, marital status, years of education), 
job-related variables (gross monthly wages, tenure, the use of computers at the workplace, 
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previous participation at continuous training programmes, employment in the individual’s 
original profession), variables on working conditions (weekly working time, the need to work 
at night or at weekend, employment in the public sector), dummy variables for occupational 
status (managerial and professional (high-skilled) occupations, white-collar and blue-collar 
occupations (skilled and unskilled)), and firm size dummies. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Our most important result is that fixed-term employees do not differ substantially from 
permanent employees with respect to job satisfaction. The estimated coefficient for our fixed-
term employment variable FTE is negative albeit insignificant. Furthermore, the ordered 
probit estimates for the other explanatory variables show, for example, that better educated 
individuals are less satisfied with their jobs. Obviously, there is a strong complementary 
relationship between an individual’s aspiration level regarding job tasks and its educational 
level. 
 
Almost all of the job-related factors are significant determinants of job satisfaction. Not 
surprisingly, wages have a strong positive impact on a worker’s job satisfaction. This result is 
therefore in line with other empirical studies on job satisfaction (e.g. Grund and Sliwka, 
2004). Furthermore, the results show a U-shaped relationship between tenure and job 
satisfaction. Hence, at first job satisfaction declines with tenure, reaches a minimum and turns 
to increase the closer the worker comes to retirement age. In other words, younger and senior 
workers tend to be more satisfied with their jobs, while prime-age workers appear to be more 
discontent with their jobs. Finally, computer users at work and employees who are still 
working in their original profession are significantly more satisfied with their jobs than their 
corresponding counterparts. Hence, computer jobs are obviously more challenging and 
convenient than non-computer jobs and individuals prefer working in the original profession 
instead of working in a foreign job. 
 
Job satisfaction is also determined by working conditions. First, job satisfaction is negatively 
related to the number of weekly working hours. Second, working in the public sector is 
associated with higher levels of job satisfaction. These less surprising results are also in line 
with previous empirical investigations (e.g. Kaiser, 2002). The coefficients of the dummy 
variables controlling for occupational status (displayed in Table A3 in the appendix) are 
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always insignificant relative to the reference group unskilled blue collar workers. Finally, the 
coefficients of the firm size dummies (displayed in Table A3 in the appendix) indicate that job 
satisfaction declines with firm size. 
 
Table 4 also contains the probit ML estimates for the determinants of the probability that 
employees are either dissatisfied with their jobs or highly satisfied. Interestingly, the 
coefficient of our explanatory variable of interest FTE in the JS_LOW equation is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level. More precisely, a discrete change of FTE from 0 to 1 (from 
permanent employment to fixed-term employment) increases the probability that an employee 
is dissatisfied with his job about 2.8 percent. In contrast, the FTE coefficient in the JS_HIGH 
equation is insignificant. The coefficients of the remaining covariates confirm the results of 
the ordered probit model. To sum up, the current model estimates provide only little evidence 
for the hypothesis that workers who are employed on the basis of a temporary contract are 
less satisfied with their jobs than permanently employed workers. The results are therefore in 
line with the majority of previous studies, which either found an insignificant effect or a 
negative effect of fixed-term employment on job satisfaction. 
 
In order to account for a possible selectivity bias in our model specification, we finally 
estimate a treatment effects model. Specifically, we suppose that the error terms in equations 
(5) and (6), ε and ν, are correlated. In this case, an OLS regression of equation (5) would 
involve an inconsistent estimate of the parameter γ. If ε and ν were positively correlated, the 
OLS estimate would be biased upward. On the other hand, if ε and ν were negatively 
correlated, the OLS estimate would be biased downward. Table 5 displays the results of our 
specified treatment effects model. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
First of all, the results of the selection model (6) and (7) indicate that an individual’s decision 
of whether or not to accept a temporary employment contract significantly depends on age, 
sex, marital status, and private computer use. Specifically, the probability to accept a fixed-
term employment contract declines with the individual’s age. Hence, younger workers are 
much more likely to be temporarily employed than prime age or senior workers. Furthermore, 
female workers and unmarried workers are more likely to accept a fixed-term employment 
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contract. These outcomes are insistently in line with our a priori expectations. Finally, 
employees who use computers privately are less likely to be temporarily employed. 
 
Most importantly, the parameter estimate for our endogenous treatment variable FTE is 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. A first conclusion of this outcome is that the 
impact of a fixed-term employment contract on job satisfaction has previously been 
understated. This result is confirmed by the estimated correlation coefficient 140.0−=ρ . The 
Wald test of independent residuals in the regression and treatment equation clearly rejects the 
null hypothesis 0=ρ . A negative ρ implies that the error terms ε and ν are negatively 
correlated, so any prior outcome indicating either insignificance or a negative connection 
between fixed-term employment and job satisfaction has to be treated cautiously. Our results 
from the treatment effects model indicate that those estimates, which do not explicitly account 
for a potential selectivity bias, may actually be biased downward. A second conclusion from 
our estimates is that any observed dissatisfaction with the job cannot be ascribed to the 
circumstance that the duration of an individual’s employment contract is only temporary 
instead of being permanent. Job satisfaction rather seems to be negatively affected by a 
number of job characteristics and working conditions, for example, low wages, a certain 
amount of tenure, no computer use at work, inadequately employment, or the amount of 
effective working hours. 
 
Finally, the estimates for the remaining covariates including the occupational status and firm 
size dummies (not displayed in the table) are very similar to the parameter estimates of the 
ordered probit model in terms of magnitude and significance. 
 
5 Management implications 
 
Before pointing out some management implications for the firms, the positive effect of fixed-
term employment on job satisfaction deserves some attention. A positive relationship between 
temporary employment and job satisfaction appears to be somewhat surprising as it 
contradicts the conventional a priori expectations and the majority of previous studies, which 
rather found evidence for a negative impact of fixed-term contracts on job satisfaction. The 
standard explanation for a negative relationship is that fixed-term employees are more likely 
to be dissatisfied with their job than permanent workers, because they failed to get a 
permanent job and their employment status is relatively insecure. The firms may use the 
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instrument of fixed-term working contracts just for the reason to keep employment flexible, 
and thus, to save dismissal costs. Fixed-term workers may therefore feel discriminated 
relative to permanent workers in terms of promotion opportunities and other long-term human 
resource management strategies. 
 
However, the empirical results of our investigation contradict to this interpretation. According 
to our results, fixed-term employees are more satisfied with their jobs than permanent 
workers. This outcome is the result of our estimation strategy as we – in contrast to other 
comparable studies – explicitly account for a potential selectivity bias in our econometric 
model. Since we explicitly consider the status of fixed-term employment as an endogenous 
binary treatment, we are able to account for the determination of fixed-term employment, 
while estimating the determinants of job satisfaction, and thus, avoid the selectivity bias. The 
results from our treatment effects model show that the probability of whether or not a worker 
accepts a fixed-term employment contract is largely determined by individual characteristics. 
Fixed-term employees significantly differ from permanent workers in terms of individual 
characteristics, e.g. age, sex, marital status, and the private effort to combine work and leisure 
using computers at home. These interpersonal differences between fixed-term and permanent 
workers are responsible for the empirical finding of a positive effect of fixed-term contracts 
on job satisfaction. There are two explanations for a positive relationship between fixed-term 
employment and job satisfaction. First, fixed-term workers may be more satisfied with their 
job than permanent workers, because they are glad that they have succeeded to leave the 
unemployment status and find a job at all. Second, fixed-term workers may have higher job 
satisfaction levels, because they are strongly motivated to achieve a permanent job in the 
future. The conclusion therefore is that job satisfaction on average is not negatively affected 
by a limited duration of an employment contract, but by certain individual characteristics, job-
related factors, and working conditions. 
 
Despite this outcome we would like to recommend the firms not to overshoot the use of fixed-
term employment contracts. Our results do not imply to replace permanent by fixed-term 
workers, because the latter are found to be more satisfied with their jobs. If a firm employed 
too many workers on the basis of fixed-term contracts, one would rather expect a reduction of 
average job satisfaction as the concerned workers are less likely to be promoted on permanent 
jobs. Furthermore, low levels of job satisfaction may be associated with a lack of worker 
motivation and thus affect productivity negatively (Clark, 1996). Our management advice for 
 18
the firms therefore is to use fixed-term employment adequately in order to extend permanent 
employment and take care of the working conditions to keep the level of job satisfaction high. 
This advice includes developing strategies in terms of flexible working schedules as well as 
strategies to improve the working conditions for better educated and more tenured workers, 
who are according to our results especially prone to be dissatisfied with their jobs. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The present paper examines the relationship between fixed-term employment and job 
satisfaction using individual-level data from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
Recently, there is a lively theoretical debate on this topic, although most arguments emphasize 
that fixed-term employment should be associated with a relatively low level of job 
satisfaction, and the majority of empirical investigations is in line with this prediction. Fixed-
term workers do usually belong to the flexibility reserve of a firm and thus have less job 
security, lower earnings and less promotion opportunities relative to the permanent core 
workers. However, there are also contrary arguments. For example, fixed-term workers may 
even be more satisfied with their job than permanent workers, if the temporary job enabled 
them to leave the unemployment status, and hence, having got a job at all is more important to 
them than for permanent workers. In this sense, fixed-term workers, whose jobs are quite 
insecure, may assess the pure employment status more valuable than permanent workers, who 
face a relatively high job security. Another argument is that fixed-term workers may report 
higher levels of job satisfaction, because they are strongly motivated to achieve a permanent 
job in the future. 
 
A major drawback of the prior empirical investigations is that none of them explicitly 
accounts for a potential selectivity bias. However, since an individual’s choice of whether or 
not to accept a fixed-term employment contract is very likely to be correlated with the level of 
reported job satisfaction, our methodological strategy is to estimate a treatment effects model 
in addition to the usual ordered probit and binary choice models in order to evaluate whether 
or not selectivity involving inconsistent parameter estimates plays a crucial role. 
 
The empirical results of our regression analyses can be summarized as follows: First, our 
ordered probit and ordinary probit ML estimates are in line with comparable prior studies, i.e., 
fixed-term employment tends to have a weak negative impact on a worker’s job satisfaction. 
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Second, after accounting for selectivity we obtain a significant positive effect of fixed-term 
employment on job satisfaction. Thus, not accounting for selectivity is associated with 
downward biased parameter estimates. According to our results, therefore, fixed-term 
employees are more satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers. This outcome is the 
result of our estimation strategy as we explicitly consider the status of fixed-term employment 
as an endogenous binary treatment. Furthermore, our treatment effects model estimates show 
that fixed-term workers significantly differ from permanent workers in terms of individual 
characteristics such as age, sex, marital status and the private effort to combine work and 
leisure using computers at home. These interpersonal differences between fixed-term and 
permanent workers are responsible for our finding of a positive connection between fixed-
term contracts and job satisfaction. The conclusion therefore is that the limited duration of an 
employment contract is not responsible for a relatively low level of job satisfaction. Hence, 
job dissatisfaction cannot hastily be ascribed to fixed-term employment. In this context, it is 
important to recognize that fixed-term workers differ substantially from permanent workers in 
terms of individual characteristics. These individual characteristics as well as some job-
related factors and working conditions are responsible for an employee’s level of job 
satisfaction. 
 
As a consequence, our estimation results do not imply to replace permanent by fixed-term 
workers as the latter are found to be more satisfied with their jobs. Although workers, who are 
satisfied with their jobs, are likely to be highly motivated and productive, firms are expected 
to suffer productivity losses from the replacement strategy, when they employ fixed-term 
workers excessively. Our management advice for the firms therefore is to use fixed-term 
employment as an extension to permanent employment and take care of the working 
conditions in order to keep the level of job satisfaction high. Firms are asked to develop 
strategies in terms of flexible working schedules and better working conditions. Particularly, 
firms should put effort on enriching the working conditions for better educated and more 
tenured workers, who are according to our results, especially prone to be dissatisfied with 
their jobs. 
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 Notes 
 
1 The author prefers the ordinary probit model to the ordered probit model, because 
estimating an ordinary probit model “allows to relate the analysis to a specific level of 
satisfaction by means of an appropriate endogenous variable” (Kaiser, 2002: 16). 
 
2 Furthermore, the thresholds 4 or 9, respectively, have been chosen using the descriptive 
statistics of Table 1. According to the results of Table 1, a value of 8 represents the 
median level of job satisfaction. Hence, levels 9 and 10 indicate high job satisfaction 
levels. Due to the relatively small case numbers for the lower levels of job satisfaction, the 
categories 0 to 4 have been combined to represent job dissatisfaction. As a consequence, 
the remaining levels 5 to 8 describe the medium job satisfaction levels of the workers. 
 
3 Since JS is the standardized form of JOBSAT, a regression of JOBSAT or JS on X and FTE 
would yield identical parameter estimates. Nevertheless, the treatment effects approach 
applied here is adequate, because the results obtained by the ordered probit model 
(requiring ordinally scaled observations) introduced in equation (2) and an alternative 
OLS regression (requiring continuously scaled observations) are very similar with respect 
to magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficients. The estimates of this 
reference OLS model are not displayed here but can, of course, be obtained from the 
authors upon request. 
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Table 1: Distribution of job satisfaction 
Job satisfaction 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N 38 24 87 180 229 659 625 1,172 1,694 784 608 
Percent  0.6 0.4 1.4 2.9 3.8 10.8 10.2 19.2 27.8 12.9 10.0 
Cumulative 0.6 1.0 2.4 5.3 9.1 19.9 30.1 49.3 77.1 90.0 100 
Note: The calculations are restricted to individuals who do not provide item non-responses for the subsequent 
regression analysis.  N is the number of observations.  
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Fixed-term vs. permanent employment: mean values of important variables 
Variable  Mean for fixed-term 
employees 
Mean for permanent 
employees 
Job satisfaction 6.97 7.15 
Log wage 8.07 8.36 
Years of education 11.92 12.03 
Worker’s age 36.14 40.26 
Tenure 2.61 10.56 
PC 0.46 0.67 
Continuous training 0.25 0.32 
Adequate job 0.46 0.59 
Unmarried 0.38 0.24 
Female 0.44 0.34 
Working hours 38.06 38.45 
Work at night or at weekend 0.63 0.63 
Nationality 0.87 0.88 
Public sector 0.32 0.20 
Note: The calculations are restricted to individuals who do not provide item non-responses for the subsequent 
regression analysis. The means of Job satisfaction have been calculated from ordinal observations. Tenure, 
PC, Continuous training, Adequate job, Unmarried, Female, Work at night or at weekend, Nationality, and 
Public sector are dummy variables. Thus, the means display the fraction of individuals belonging to that 
certain feature.  
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the binary dependent variables 
Variable Min-Max Mean Standard deviation 
JS_LOW 0-1 0.091 0.288 
JS_HIGH 0-1 0.228 0.419 
Note: The calculations are restricted to individuals who do not provide item non-responses for the subsequent 
regression analysis.   
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations. 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of job satisfaction 
Dependent Variable JOBSAT JS_LOW JS_HIGH 
Estimation method Ordered probit Probit ML Probit ML 
 Fixed-term 
Employment (FTE) 
-0.048 (-0.80) 0.028* (1.74) -0.008 (-0.38) 
Individual characteristics       
 Female -0.001 (-0.03) 0.001 (0.08) 0.009 (0.71) 
 Unmarried 0.016 (0.51) -0.001 (-0.16) 0.011 (0.91) 
 Years of education -0.033*** (-4.77) -0.111*** (-4.99) -0.012*** (-4.26) 
Job-related factors       
 Log wage 0.303*** (6.46) -0.052*** (-4.75) 0.066*** (3.44) 
 Tenure -0.016*** (-3.56) 0.003** (2.54) -0.005*** (-3.05) 
 Tenure2 (*100) 0.035*** (2.67) -0.007** (-2.01) 0.011** (2.10) 
 PC 0.090*** (3.96) -0.013** (-2.13) 0.027*** (3.02) 
 Continuous training -0.008 (-0.28) -0.003 (-0.38) -0.011 (-0.93) 
 Adequate job 0.074** (2.30) -0.023*** (-2.59) 0.006 (0.47) 
Working conditions       
 Working time -0.008** (-2.07) 0.001 (1.60) -0.001 (-0.85) 
 Nightshift / weekend -0.041 (-1.49) 0.005 (0.70) -0.001 (-0.08) 
 Public sector 0.114*** (3.27) -0.021** (-2.35) 0.048*** (3.34) 
Occupational status yes  yes  yes   
Firm size dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant   0.568 (0.96) -1.803*** (-3.31) 
Wald χ2 test 137.92*** 59.16*** 71.32*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0060 0.0158 0.0111 
N  6,100 6,100 6,100 
Note: * significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level; robust z-
values in parentheses. The parameter estimates in the equations for JS_LOW and JS_HIGH are marginal 
effects. The model specification contains six dummy variables indicating occupational status and six firm 
size dummies. The Wald χ2 test and Pseudo-R2 provide information about the fit of the specified model. N is 
the number of observations.  
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations. 
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Table 5: Treatment effects model estimates of job satisfaction 
Dependent Variable JS FTE (Treatment equation) 
Estimation method MLE MLE 
 Fixed-term Employment 
(FTE) 
0.199** (2.26)   
Individual characteristics     
 Female -0.012 (-0.42) 0.166*** (3.12) 
 Unmarried 0.000 (0.01) 0.125** (1.99) 
 Age   -0.015*** (-4.80) 
 Nationality   -0.028 (-0.35) 
 Private PC use   -0.075** (-2.06) 
 Years of education -0.026*** (-4.24) -0.005 (-0.45) 
Job-related factors     
 Log wage 0.270*** (6.69)   
 Tenure -0.014*** (-3.58)   
 Tenure2 (*100) 0.030*** (2.70)   
 PC 0.076*** (3.98)   
 Continuous training 0.000 (0.00)   
 Adequate job 0.079*** (2.84)   
Working conditions     
 Working time -0.007** (-2.19)   
 Nightshift / weekend -0.039 (-1.62)   
 Public sector 0.092*** (3.14)   
Occupational status yes    
Firm size dummies yes    
Constant -1.499*** (-4.34) -0.878*** (-4.69) 
ρ  -0.140 
Wald test ( 0=ρ ) 19.40*** 
Wald χ2 test 156.31*** 
N  6,100 
Note: * significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level; robust z-
values in parentheses. The model specification contains six dummy variables indicating occupational status 
and six firm size dummies. The Wald χ2 test provides information about the fit of the specified model. N is 
the number of observations. 
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
 Fixed-term 
Employment (FTE) 
Dummy variable indicating whether an individual is temporarily or 
permanently employed  
Dependent variables  
 JOBSAT Ordinal variable measuring an individual’s job satisfaction between 0 
(completely dissatisfied) and 10 (completely satisfied) 
 JS_LOW Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has a relative 
low level of job satisfaction (categories 0 to 4)  
 JS_HIGH Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has a high level 
of job satisfaction (categories 9 and 10) 
Individual characteristics  
 Female Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is female 
 Unmarried Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is unmarried  
 Age Age of the individual  
 Nationality Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is a German 
citizen  
 Private PC use Count variable between 0 and 2 (0 = individual uses neither computers 
nor the internet privately; 1 = individual uses either computers or the 
internet privately; 2 = individual uses both computers and the internet 
privately) 
 Years of education Years of an individual’s education  
Job-related factors  
 Log wage Log of an individual’s recent gross earnings  
 Tenure Years of an individual’s intra-firm job tenure 
 PC Count variable between 0 and 2 (0 = individual uses neither computers 
nor the internet at work; 1 = individual uses either computers or the 
internet at work; 2 = individual uses both computers and the internet at 
work) 
 Continuous training Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has recently 
participated in continuous training programmes  
 Adequate job Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is working in 
its original job  
Working conditions  
 Working time Number of effective working hours per week 
 Nightshift / weekend Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is at least 
sometimes working at night or at weekends  
 Public sector Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is employed in 
the public sector 
Occupational status Six dummy variables for managers, highly skilled white collar workers, 
skilled white collar workers, skilled blue collar workers, unskilled white 
collar workers, and unskilled blue collar workers 
Firm size dummies Six dummy variables indicating different firm size classes (< 5 
employees, 5-19 employees, 20-99 employees, 100-199 employees, 200-
1,999 employees, 2,000 and more employees) 
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the variables not presented in Table 2 
Variable Min-Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Job satisfaction (JOBSAT) 0-10 7.146 1.95 
Fixed-term Employment (FTE) 0-1 0.063 0.24 
Female 0-1 0.346 0.47 
Unmarried 0-1 0.255 0.43 
Age 18-65 40.00 10.39 
Nationality 0-1 0.885 0.31 
Private PC use 0-2 0.614 0.78 
Years of education 7-18 12.02 2.40 
Log wage 4.60-10.30 8.349 0.43 
Tenure 0-47.9 10.05 9.23 
PC 0-2 0.665 0.78 
Continuous training 0-1 0.315 0.46 
Adequate job 0-1 0.584 0.49 
Working time 8-77 38.43 3.47 
Nightshift / weekend 0-1 0.633 0.48 
Public sector 0-1 0.207 0.40 
Manager 0-1 0.014 0.11 
High skilled white collar workers 0-1 0.165 0.37 
Skilled white collar workers 0-1 0.287 0.45 
Skilled blue collar workers 0-1 0.259 0.43 
Unskilled white collar workers  0-1 0.095 0.29 
Unskilled blue collar workers 0-1 0.178 0.38 
Note: The calculations are restricted to individuals who do not provide item non-responses for the subsequent 
regression analysis.   
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations.  
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Table A3: Estimates for occupational status and firm size dummies from the ordered 
probit model (not displayed in Table 4) 
Dependent Variable JOBSAT 
Estimation method Ordered probit 
Occupational status   
 Manager 0.036 (0.27) 
 High skilled white collar workers 0.019 (0.28) 
 Skilled white collar workers 0.020 (0.37) 
 Skilled blue collar workers 0.059 (1.20) 
 Unskilled white collar workers -0.004 (-0.08) 
Firm size   
 5 to 19 employees -0.141** (-2.10) 
 20 to 99 employees -0.144** (-2.17) 
 100 to 199 employees -0.141* (-1.95) 
 200 to 1,999 employees -0.153** (-2.26) 
 2,000 and more employees -0.173** (-2.50) 
Note: * significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level; robust z-
values in parentheses. The reference group for occupational status is the group of unskilled blue collar 
workers. The reference group for the firm size dummies are small establishments employing less than 5 
workers.  
Source: GSOEP 2000, own calculations. 
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